Family, governmental, domestic corporations and board of directors and audit committee effectiveness in GCC by Alroqy, Faisal Ayid & Aljaaid, Khaled Salmen
  
 
                                                                                                                                      pp 89-104 
89 | P a g e  
Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management (JCGIRM) 
2016, Volume 3, Series 3 
Family, Governmental, Domestic Corporations and Board of 
Directors and Audit Committee Effectiveness in GCC** 
Faisal Ayid Alroqy a,* Khaled Salmen Aljaaid b  
a Accounting Department, College of Business Umm Al-Qura Unviersity, Saudi Arabia 
b Accounting Department, College of Administrative Sciences Hadhramuat University, Republic of Yemen 
A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
This study aims at investigating the association between ownership 
structure (government ownership, family ownership and domestic corporate 
ownership) and the interaction of board of directors effectiveness and audit 
committee effectiveness by GCC listed companies. The study utilizes a 
cross-sectional analysis of 492 firm-year observations during the 2006-
2010 period. A pooled OLS regression analysis is used to estimate the 
associations proposed in the hypotheses. The study finds that government 
and domestic corporate ownerships are positively related to the 
effectiveness of board of directors and audit committee. However, such 
association could not be reported by the family ownership. The results of 
this study suggest that government-owned and domestic corporate-owned 
companies are characterized to have good corporate governance practices 
in terms of board of directors and audit committee as internal control and 
monitoring mechanisms. Further, the results of this study contribute to the 
existing theory and empirical evidence of how the effectiveness of board of 
directors and audit committee is related to monitoring and controlling 
ownership type. This study offers policy-makers additional evidence to be 
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Corporate governance has been incrementally the focus of regulators, investors, lenders and  
other stakeholders in the today's business market. The corporate governance structure 
concerns about distributing rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
company such as board of directors, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and 
spelling out the rules and procedures regarding making decisions on company’s affairs. In 
the same line, corporate governance also provides the framework through which the company 
can be guided to set its objectives, attain those objectives, and monitor performance. 
Therefore, companies that are practicing good corporate governance can be described as 
companies having well-defined and protected shareholder rights, a solid control environment, 
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high levels of transparency and disclosure, and an empowered board. More important is that 
the interest of the company and those of shareholders are well aligned (Hawkamah & IFC, 
2008). Corruption practices, such as Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, and Adelphia 
scandals have put corporate governance under investigation. Kawaura (2004) finds that the 
ineffective governance structure is  responsible for the crisis of Japanese banks in the 1990s. 
Studies of corporate governance recently concern about the board of directors. Agency theory 
proposes a divergence in managerial and owners’ interests occur when there is a separation 
of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The board constitutes the supreme 
authority at the firm level in making decisions. This mechanism is a market-induced and a 
low-cost monitoring device. It is responsible for representing the shareholders' interests, 
defending these interests and fighting against nonqualified managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Fama, 1980). The board of directors has  to fulfill two functions: (1) monitoring management 
and (2) providing expert advice. Both functions include the decision of auditor selection 
(Houqe & Zijl, 2008; Kirkos et al., 2008; Yatim, Kent & Clarkson, 2006). Furthermore, The 
attentions of regulatory authorities as well as academics are increasingly dedicated in recent 
times towards audit committees (Abbott  &  Parker, 2000; Lennox & Park, 2007; Wolnizer, 
1995). This is because audit committees are now being observed to be effective handles in 
operating corporate governance employed in the corporate governance models of Japan-
German and Anglo-Saxon (Karim & Zijl, 2008). The audit committees perform an essential 
responsibility of monitoring in order to ensure corporate accountability and financial reports 
quality (Klein 1998; Birkett, 1986). The literatures at international level have been 
synthesized by Wolnizer (1995) with the claim that the supervisory role of audit committee 
be basically one, accounting and financial reporting; two, auditors and auditing; and three, 
corporate governance. 
 
Given the governance issues arising from the separation of ownership and  control,  several 
studies examining an AC formation, board formation and ownership structure have been 
empirically investigated based primarily on Anglo-Saxon countries and similar markets 
(Collier & Gregory, 1999; Menon &Williams, 1994; Pincus, Rusbarsky,&Wong, 1989; 
Turpin & DeZoort, 1998; Chau and Leung, 2006; Mendez and Garcia, 2007). This study will 
hopefully contribute to extending empirical research into ownership structure, board and 
audit committee effectiveness in GCC markets, which is a special case, one hallmark of which 
is an institutional framework that clearly differs from that of its Anglo-Saxon counterparts. It 
may not, in fact, be wise to extrapolate empirical evidence from Anglo- Saxon markets to 
their GCC counterparts for several  reasons:  (1)  Previous  studies  used  managerial  
ownership  as  a  proxy  for    company ownership (Woo & Koh, 2001; Lennox, 2000; DeFond, 
1992). This category of ownership may be inapplicable in the setting of the GCC because 
ownership structure in GCC countries is controlled by three groups of shareholders: 
government, family, and domestic corporations (Chahine, 2007; Chahine & Tohme, 2009; 
Omran et al., 2008). This dominance is a result of the weakness of investor protection, and 
the absence of well-developed markets for corporate control (Chahine & Tohme, 2009; 
Harabi, 2007; Hawkamah & IFC, 2008; Omran et al., 2008; Saidi & Kumar, 2007). (2) GCC 
governments have intervened heavily in linking legal origins and financial arrangements. 
GCC countries are still suffering from a lack of equity among   investors. 
(3) Arab companies suffer from the cultural heritage that has been brought into from the 
history. These inheritances do not encourage the implementation of sound management 
practices (Ali, 1995). (4) The current corporate governance frameworks of GCC countries do 
not meet the threshold sought by international investors (AL Majlis, The GCC Board 
Directors Institute, 2009). Corporate governance reform is often investor-driven in more 
developed markets, but in the GCC, the burden of corporate governance improvements falls 
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on the regulators. Much of this stems from a combination of facts such as the ownership 
structures of GCC companies, the ready availability of liquidity and financing from regional 
banks, and the relatively underdeveloped capital markets. (5) Recently, however, GCC 
countries have adopted and developed large-scale economic and market policies and 
strategies that convert them to market-oriented economies. In this case, these issues may have 
an influence on the quality of board of directors and audit committee in the GCC, and agency 
problems are more likely to arise between majority and minority shareholders. 
 
This study investigates the variation in the level of board and audit committee quality caused 
by different ownership structures among GCC companies. An agency theory framework is 
used to analyze the association between ownership structure and board of directors and audit 
committee effectiveness in GCC setting. One of the objectives of this paper is to extend such 
analyses in a number of important ways. This study introduces a different classification of 
ownership structure that fits the setting of GCC countries. Previous studies conducted in the 
developed and high- developing countries have used managerial ownership as a proxy for 
company ownership or different structure of ownership. This category of ownership may be 
inapplicable in the setting of the GCC because ownership structure in GCC countries is 
controlled by three groups of shareholders: government, family, and domestic corporations 
(Chahine, 2007; Chahine & Tohme, 2009; Omran et al., 2008). Furthermore, this study adds 
to the recent literature by investigating and associating ownership structure with board of 
directors and audit committee effectiveness. To the best of the researcher’s awareness, no 
empirical evidence is available that has linked board of directors characteristics and audit 
committee characteristics as a whole to capture the strength of their degree impacted by the 
variation in the ownership structure. Yet if these characteristics act in a complementary or 
substitutable fashion in making decisions, board of directors and audit committee 
characteristics should be examined as a bundle and not isolated from each other (e.g., Cai et 
al., 2009; Davis & Useem, 2002; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Ward et  al., 2009). 
 
 
The findings of this study should be of interest to policymakers in GCC as well as to those 
emerging markets in the Middle East because of the similarities in the institutional and 
cultural environments and in the corporate ownership structure of firms (La Porta & Lopezde-
silanes, 1999). The results may also be of interest to other researchers who are investigating 
the characteristics of firms in the formation and effectiveness of board of directors, ACs, and 
ownership structure. In addition, the results of this study will hopefully motivate further 
inquiries into why the effectiveness of board of directors and ACs varies among different 
degrees of family, government, and domestic corporate ownership structure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review 
and the hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the research methodology. The results 
and discussions have been highlighted in section 4. The final section provides conclusions 
and implications. 
 
2. Literature review and development of hypotheses 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance in the GCC 
 
Corporate governance is defined as the system through which corporations are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance structure concerns about distributing rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the company such as board of directors, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spelling out the rules and procedures 
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regarding making decisions on company’s affairs. In the same line, corporate governance 
also provides the framework through which the company can be guided to set its objectives, 
attain those objectives, and monitor performance. Therefore, companies that are practicing 
good corporate governance can be described as companies having well-defined and protected 
shareholder rights, a solid control environment, high levels of transparency and disclosure, 
and an empowered board. More important is that the interest of the company and those of 
shareholders are well aligned (Hawkamah & IFC, 2008). Corruption practices, such as Enron, 
Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, and Adelphia scandals have put corporate governance under 
investigation. Kawaura (2004) finds that the ineffective governance structure is responsible 
for the crisis of Japanese banks in the 1990s. Corporate governance matters to stakeholders 
for broadly similar purposes. These stakeholders include investors, companies, the public 
sector,  and other stakeholders such as banks; suppliers; and employees (Hawkamah & IFC, 
2008). 
The OECD principles of Corporate Governance first endorsed by OECD ministers in 1999 
(a reviewed and revised version of them is now available, since 2005), are intended to assist 
OECD and non-OECD governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, 
institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries. The 
World Bank has used OECD principles of CG to assess the state of corporate governance in 
some of its member countries, including Arab countries. Over the years, several institutions 
have developed their  own set of codes and principles like the Institute of International 
Finance’s Policies of Corporate Governance and Transparency in Emerging Markets, which 
established a code based on criteria are considered important to international investors 
(Harabi, 2007; Hawkamah & IFC, 2008). 
The increasing openness and integration of GCC countries with the global economy has 
created push-and-pull factors that are contributing to changing the corporate governance 
environment. Policy and regulatory reforms in the GCC have been led by international 
convergence and adoption of prudential and regulatory codes and standards, such as Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CTF), Basel banking supervision 
core principles, and international obligations and agreements resulting from entry into WTO, 
Regional trade Agreements  (RTAs)  and  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs).     This  has  
been  reinforced by competitive pressure and emulation within the countries of the GCC. 
Moreover, international institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO and the BIS have 
played a role in providing technical assistance and building knowledge and capacity (Harabi, 
2007; Saidi & Kumar, 2007; Hawkamah & IFC, 2008). 
Globalization, liberalization and the interlinking of markets have brought about an increased 
pressure for change. These are compounded by the regional and international investors such 
as the increasing presence of international firms in the region and the increasing number of 
Western expatriates in senior management level positions, who are subject to global corporate 
standards. All these factors contribute in the creation of a superior corporate structure and 
offer GCC companies with the encouragement to invest in the adoption of better standards. 
It is imperative to acknowledge that the boom in the GCC has been urged by the desire to 
diversify the economy from oil to a more sustainable business model for the future. As such, 
the most ideal way to achieve sustainability, prosperity and job creation in the long term 
context is through ensuring that firms are capable of providing investors with superior returns 
in the present and in the future. A framework encapsulating effective internal governance is 
invaluable in guiding the firms towards the above objectives while simultaneously ensuring 
corporate flexibility in uncertain times (Hawkamah Newsletter, 2008). Regulatory authorities 
throughout the region have employed steps to enhance corporate governance mechanisms 
owing to three factors; the downward correction in regional markets in 2005 followed by the 
efforts by the authorities to improve standards and protect shareholders particularly during 
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the widespread public participation in equity markets, the inclination of GCC corporations to 
take part in the global market competition and thus adhere to international standards and 
finally, attempts to attract foreign direct investments to the Arab region (AL Majlis, The GCC 
Board Directors Institute, 2009). 
Hawkamah’s research indicates that there have been significant improvements in corporate 
governance in GCC region in just a few short years. Although implementation is still patchy, 
the concept and principles of corporate governance are now well accepted. Regulators and  
companies have taken substantial steps, albeit from a low base, to improve their practices. 
Almost all GCC countries now have corporate governance codes or guidelines in place for 
publicly listed companies (Saidi, 2011). However, corporate governance is still a relatively 
new concept in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The corporate governance  
frameworks of GCC countries in the present time fail to meet the threshold expected by 
international investors (AL Majlis, The GCC Board Directors Institute, 2009). This is because 
corporate governance reform is primarily run in the developed markets by investors but in 
the GCC, the weight of corporate governance improvements lies on the regulators. This 
depends on  a combination of factors including ownership structures of GCC firms (primarily 
family or state- owned), the availability of liquidity and financing present in regional banks 
and the underdeveloped capital markets. Arab firms are still inclined to follow concentrated 
ownership and hence, other factors such as generational ties and family involvement effect 
the firms’ governance relations and agreements (INSEAD, The Business School for the 
World, 2010). Consequently, international investors taking corporate governance very 
seriously steer themselves away from GCC markets (INSEAD, The Business School for the 
World, 2010). Further, GCC financial markets remain underdeveloped and do not sufficiently 
protect minority investors. The GCC largely follow a civil-law system, but are still 
significantly affected by their political regimes (Chahine & Tohme, 2009; Al-Shammari et 
al., 2008; Al-Hussaini & Al-Sultan, 2008; Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; Bley & Chen, 2006). 
 
2.2 Board of directors and audit committee effectiveness score 
 
Several empirical studies in different disciplines have reported an association between 
weaknesses in governance and poor financial reporting quality, earnings manipulation, 
financial statement fraud, and weaker internal controls (Carcello & Neal, 2000; Carcello & 
Hermanson, 1999; Beasley, Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000; Klein, 2002). 
McKinsey and  Co (2002) indicate that a key factor for making investing decision by 
institutional investors is corporate governance. Furthermore, Dewing and O’Russell (2004) 
document that corporate governance mechanisms influence positively on the issue of 
accountability. 
 
Studies of corporate governance recently concern about the board of directors. Agency theory 
proposes a divergence in managerial and owners’ interests occur when there is a separation 
of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The board constitutes the supreme 
authority at the firm level in making decisions. This mechanism is a market-induced and a 
low-cost monitoring device. It is responsible for representing the shareholders' interests, 
defending these interests and fighting against nonqualified managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Fama, 1980). The board of directors has to fulfill two functions: (1) monitoring management 
and (2) providing expert advice (Houqe & Zijl, 2008; Kirkos et al., 2008; Yatim, Kent & 
Clarkson, 2006). Furthermore, according to Hawkamah and IFC survey of 2008, around 49% 
of listed companies in MENA countries (i.e., GCC) consider the responsibility for corporate 
governance policies to the board—in-line with good practice. But, the role of the board is 
often misunderstood in the MENA region.  According to the survey, 89.9% of MENA banks 
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and listed companies stated  that the board, and not management, was responsible for setting 
corporate management, which is contrary to the good practice that management develops, 
and the board reviews and guides corporate strategy. As for the audit committee 
effectiveness. The attentions of regulatory authorities as well as academics are increasingly 
dedicated in recent times towards audit committees (Abbott & Parker, 2000; Lennox & Park, 
2007; Wolnizer, 1995). This is because audit committees are now being observed to be 
effective handles in operating corporate governance employed in the corporate governance 
models of Japan-German and Anglo-Saxon (Karim & Zijl, 2008). The audit committees 
perform an essential responsibility of monitoring in order to ensure corporate accountability 
and financial reports quality (Klein 1998; Birkett, 1986). The literatures at international level 
have been synthesized by Wolnizer (1995) with the claim that the supervisory role of audit 
committee be basically one, accounting and financial reporting; two, auditors and auditing; 
and three, corporate governance. 
 
Several prior researches on corporate governance have empirically linked ownership 
structure with board and audit committee effectiveness either by examining the board and 
audit committee characteristics in an individual manner or by examining separately the board 
characteristics from audit committee characteristics (Collier & Gregory, 1999; Menon 
&Williams, 1994; Pincus, Rusbarsky,&Wong, 1989; Turpin & DeZoort, 1998; Chau and 
Leung, 2006; Mendez and Garcia, 2007). Unlike these previous studies, the current study 
investigates the board and audit  committee characteristics as a composite measure including 
the board of directors characteristics (independence, size, meetings, CEO duality, financial 
expertise, nationality and international experience) and the audit committee characteristics 
(independence, size, meetings, financial expertise, nationality and international experience). 
The reasoning behind using a composite measure  of  corporate  governance  mechanisms  is  
that  the  ideal  combination  of corporate governance mechanisms is considered invaluable 
in decreasing the agency cost and safeguarding the shareholders’ interests owing to the 
effectiveness of corporate governance achieved through various channels and specific 
mechanism’s effectiveness hinges on the effectiveness of other factors (Cai et al., 2009). 
Additionally, Ward et al. (2009) claim that it is more optimal to examine the corporate 
mechanisms as a group of mechanisms protecting shareholders’ interests and not as 
individual entities because they complement each other or are alternates for each  other. They 
added that the previous studies provided inconsistent findings because they  examined them 
individually and how each may contribute in resolving agency problems in isolation; in other 
words, they overlooked that individual mechanism’s hinges on its counterparts. Similarly, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) stated that the findings of the individual mechanism’s impact 
may be erroneous as the impact of some single mechanisms is diminished  in the combined 
model. Along the same line, the measurement of the combined impact indicates a stronger 
effect as compared to measurement of individual impacts (O’Sullivan et al., 2008). 
 
2.3 Ownership structure 
 
2.3.1 Family ownership 
 
Carey et al. (2000) argue that agency problems such as self-interest, conflict of interests and 
goals and information asymmetry can still arise in family businesses. Therefore, agency 
theory predicts the existence of potential conflict in family business (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
In GCC setting, the family has been at the core of political and economic influence, families 
with most board representation can be thought of as controlling the economy (TNI Market 
Insight, 2008). They hold on average between 19% and 30% of company board seats (TNI 
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Market Insight, 2008). Over 50% of large family owned businesses would like to list in the 
region’s stock exchanges; 20% of those are already planning to issue IPOs and 30% are 
intending to do so in  the near future (Hawkamah newsletter, 2009). The main reasons that 
drive family business IPOs include: enhancing the company’s profile and reputation; 
providing an exit route for family members by divestment; providing capital to finance 
expansion; providing acquisition currency in the form of shares; and international recognition 
(depending on the choice of market) (Hawkamah newsletter, 2009). 
On the basis of these rationales, the present study proposes an association between family 
ownership and board of directors and audit committee effectiveness. The testable hypothesis 
is stated as follows: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is an association between family ownership and board of directors  
and audit committee effectiveness. 
 
2.3.2 Government ownership 
 
High levels of government ownership create a series of agency problems of ineffective 
corporate governance that directly results in poor firm performance (Qi et al., 2000; Wang et 
al., 2005; Xu & Wang, 1999) and, consequently, low levels of board and audit committee 
effectiveness. Moreover, it is evidenced that companies with political connections access to 
cheap loans (Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2007) which, consequently, make them raise 
capital through  these connections without having to reduce information asymmetry with 
more credible  financial statements (Wang et al., 2008). Further, Chaney et al. (2011) 
document that politically connected firms, despite their poorer quality earnings, are not 
penalized with higher borrowing costs. 
The above disputing discussion guides the present study to propose an association between 
government ownership and board of directors and audit committee effectiveness. The testable 
hypothesis is identified as follows: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is an association between government ownership and board of 
directors and audit committee effectiveness. 
 
 
2.3.3 Domestic corporate ownership 
 
The agency costs would be reduced in a case when there is an increase in the holdings of the 
owner-largest shareholder. Therefore, the controlling owners will be motivated to improve 
earnings informativeness due to their need in managing earnings for the purpose of alleviating 
contractual constraints. This circumstance is associated with board of directors and audit 
committee effectiveness. Increasing the quality of board of directors and audit committee by 
the controlling owners is expected to signal a good practice of corporate governance and it 
gives a credible financial reporting from the perspective of the minority shareholders and 
other  investors. Allen and Phillips (2000) empirically report that corporate ownership can 
reduce the costs of monitoring the alliances or ventures between firms and their substantial 
shareholders in companies involved in certain business agreements. It is further indicated that 
higher degrees of technical and organizational and financial resources are provided by 
domestic investors than those provided by foreign investors (Chibber & Majumdar, 1999; 
Djankov & Hoekman, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000). This leads to propose direct evidence 
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on the association between domestic corporate ownership and the board of directors and audit 
committee effectiveness. The testable hypothesis is stated in a direct form: 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between domestic corporate ownership 
and board of directors and audit committee effectiveness. 
 
3. Data collection and research design 
 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
 
the population of interest comprises all non-financial companies listed on the Stock 
Exchanges  of the five members of the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) with auditor 
switches during the period from 2006 to 2010. This selection is the most recent test period 
for which data were available. Further, the boom of the GCC clearly emerged in early 2005 
(Chahine & Tohme, 2009). The information has been gathered as of three points in time; 
before, during and after the auditor switches. Samples selected for the three years spanning 
from 2006 to 2010 are depicted  in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection during 2006-2010 
 Total Observation 
Total listed companies 172 company 
Period of study (2006-2010) 3 year 
Total observations 516 observations 
Missing and Incomplete data (24 observations) 
Total observations selected 492 observations 
 
3.2 Regression model and definition of variables 
 
The economic model is used to develop a model of board and audit committee 
effectiveness. The variables proposed for inclusion in the model capture differences in the 
costs of agency relationships. The dependent variable is a continuous measurement. To 
estimate this model, Multivariate Analysis is applied using Multiple regression model 
because the dependent variable is a continuous nature. A pooled OLS regression analysis 
is used to estimate the associations proposed in the hypotheses. The functional equation 
of the multiple regression model is utilized to determine the extent of the influence of each 
of the independent variables on the board and audit committee effectiveness: 
 
BAC_EFFE = β0 + β1 FAMILY_OWN + β2 GOV_OWN + β3 DOMESTIC_OWN + 
Control 
variables + e 
 
Where the dependent variable is: 
 
BAC_EFFE = Board and audit committee effectiveness 
Where the independent variables are: 
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FAMILY_OWN = percentage of 5 or more of the ordinary shares held by a family, 
GOV_OWN = percentage of 5 or more of the ordinary shares held by the 
government and its agencies, 
DOMESTIC_OWN = percentage of 5 or more of the ordinary shares held by 
domestic corporations 
Control variables  
FSIZE = log10  of the total assets, 
ROE = return on equity, 
LEV = total debt to total assets, 
AUD_CHANGE = "1" if auditor is changed, "0" otherwise, 












4. Results and discussion 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analyses 
 
Table 4.1 predicts the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of each variable in 




Descriptive statistics (N = 492) 
Panel A: Independent variables 
Variables Mean Std.Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FAMILY_OWN .124 .192 .000 .950 
GOV_OWN .081 .163 .000 1.00 
DOMESTIC_OWN .250 .266 .000 1.00 
Control variables 
    
FSIZE 1937085.762681 6995892.1297166 2097.5000 78121395.2600 
ROE 12.707 32.039 -186.220 503.210 
LEV 20.946 22.572 .000 115.800 
Panel B: Dependent variable 
BAC_EFFE .444 .1662 .07 .86 
Panel C: Control variable (a dichotomous measure) 
Companies with 
an auditor change 
Otherwise 






Table 4.1; panel A shows that there is a significant range of variation among the considered 
sample of this study. The range of family ownership FAMILY_OWN is from .000 to .95 
with a mean of .124 and standard deviation of .192. The range of government ownership 
GOV_OWN is from .000 to 1.00 with a mean of .081 and standard deviation of .163. as for 
the domestic corporate ownership DOMESTIC_OWN, it ranges from .000 to 1.00 with a 
mean of .250 and standard deviation of .266. With respect to the control variables, firm 
size FSIZE ranges from S.R2097.500 to S.R78121395.2600 with a mean of 
S.R1937085.762681 and standard deviation of S.R6995892.1297166. The range of return 
on equity ROE is from -186.220 to 503.210 with a mean of 12.707 and standard deviation 
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of 32.039. The range of leverage LEV is from .000 to 115.800 with a mean of 20.946 and 
standard deviation of 22.572. As for auditor change AUD_CHANGE as shown in panel C, 
the majority of the sample companies (61%) have changed their auditors during the three 
points in time selected. In terms of the dependent variable; board and audit committee 
effectiveness BD_AC, panel B shows a range between .07 to .86 with a mean of .444 and 
standard deviation of .1662, meaning that there is a variation  among the  sample 
companies in terms of the degree of board and audit committee effectiveness. 
 
The Pearson correlations between the variables are presented in Table 4.2. Most of the 
coefficients of correlation are small and the highest correlation was between FSIZE and 
AUD_CHANGE, indicating that larger firms have a higher incidence of switching auditors. 
 
Table 4.2 
Pearson Correlation Analysis results (n = 492) 
FAMILY_OWN GOV_OWN DOMESTIC_OWN FSIZE ROE LEV AUD_CHANGE 
FAMILY_OWN 1.00       
GOV_OWN -.249 1.00      
DOMESTIC_OWN -.220 -.254 1.00     
FSIZE -.224 .304 -.134 1.00    
ROE -.006 .046 -.027 .031 1.00   
LEV .146 -.102 .114 .006 -.196 1.00  
AUD_CHANGE -.070 -.021 .005 -.344 -.012 .061 1.00 
** Significant at 1 per cent level (2-tailed). 
*Significant at 5 per cent level (2-tailed). 
 
the correlation matrix confirms that no multicollinearity exists between the variables as 
none of the variables correlates above 0.80 or 0.90 all variables have a correlation of less 
than 0.304 (Myers, 1990). 
 
4.2 Regression results and discussions 
 
Pooled Ordinary-Least Square (OLS) was used to evaluate the level of effect of the 
hypothesized variable, family ownership, government ownership, and domestic corporate 
ownership on the effectiveness of audit committee. Table 4.3 shows that the coefficient of 
determination (adjusted R
2
) for BD_AC is equal to 12.2. The statistics show that this model 
has explained 12.2% of the total variance in the effectiveness of board and audit committee. 
The table also depicts that the 
model is a statistically significant where the F test statistic = 10.749 with a p-value < 0.001, 
indicating that the overall model can be interpreted. 
 
Table 4.3 
Pooled OLS regression (n = 492) 
Variables Expected sign Coeff. t p-value 
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(Constant)   9.793 0.000 
FAMILY_OWN  -0.55 -1.138 0.256 
GOV_OWN  0.175 3.696 0.000 
DOMESTIC_OWN + 0.203 4.329 0.000 
Control variables     
FSIZE  -0.200 -4.023 0.000 
ROE  0.080 1.861 0.063 
LEV  0.115 2.578 0.010 






   
Model F-stat. 10.749    
P-value 0.000    
 
 
As illustrated by Table 4.4, the regression coefficient for GOV_OWN is positive (.175) and 
statistically  significant   (p  <  0.001),  suggesting  that   government  ownership  is associated 
positively with the effectiveness of board and audit committee in GCC. This result is 
consistent with the prediction of agency theory and supported empirical studies. It provides 
support for hypothesis H2. Further, the regression coefficient for DOMESTIC_OWN is 
positive (.203) and statistically significant (p < 0.001), indicating that domestic corporate 
ownership influences positively the effectiveness of board and audit committee in GCC. 
Therefore, this result gives support to the suggestion of agency theory and the supporting 
empirical evidence. Hence, hypothesis H3 is accepted. On the other hand, this study fails to 
find an association between FAMILY_OWN and the effectiveness of board and audit 
committee in GCC. Therefore, hypothesis H1 is not supported. An explanation to this result 
could be attributed to the model specification in which the associations of government and 
domestic corporations are more influential than family ownership when aggregated in one 
model. Supporting this evidence, an additional analysis is run excluding government and 
domestic corporations as depicted in the following Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 
Pooled OLS regression (n = 492) 
   
Variables Coeff. t p-value 
(Constant)  11.225 0.000 
FAMILY_OWN -0.127 -3.206 0.001 
Control variables    
FSIZE -0.037 -4.138 0.000 
ROE 0.000 1.951 0.052 
LEV 0.115 2.578 0.010 












Table 4.4 shows that there is a significantly negative association (t = -3.206, p < 0.001) 
between family ownership and the effectiveness of board and audit committee in GCC 
region. Therefore, this result gives support to the agency theory and the supported 
empirical evidence. 
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5. Conclusions and implications 
 
Our study examines the association of family ownership, government ownership and 
domestic corporate ownership with the effectiveness of board and audit committee in the 
GCC region. The hypotheses of this study are based on the premise that family and 
government ownerships affects the effectiveness of board and audit committee. Further, 
domestic corporate ownership influences positively such effectiveness. Since this study 
focuses on the GCC setting which is referred to as a unique corporate ownership and 
corporate governance structure, it does  contribute to the body of literature in providing 
empirical evidence regarding the board and audit committee effectiveness. It is worth 
mentioning that GCC companies are characterized as having unclear separation of 
ownership and control as that found in the Western countries. Therefore, the result of 
this study can be used as a piece of evidence adding to the current body of literature about 
Arab countries and similar markets. Our result supports the hypotheses that government, 
domestic and corporations do influence positively the effectiveness of board and audit 
committee. One important implication of this finding relates to the issue of board and audit 
committee effectiveness in GCC. GCC governments, stock market, companies and 
accounting and auditing regulators would gain some new insights from this study in terms 
of the understanding the association of family ownership, government ownership and 
domestic corporate ownership with the effectiveness of ard and audit committee. The 
results of this study would benefit banks in the way that they can assess the 
creditworthiness of incorporating companies in GCC. Moreover, credit decisions made by 
lenders are determined based on information included in the financial statements. 
Therefore, board and audit committee effectiveness issues are of the utmost important for 
any lending institution. Investors and financial analysts may depend on issues of the 
effectiveness of board and audit committee to interpret decisions related to bonds, bond 
rating, interest rate, and all other decisions related to investments in GCC markets. 
Accordingly, increased understanding and prediction of companies’ events is important to 
this user group. Further, the results of this study will be of interest to the researchers and 
academic community due to a lack of formal research body addressing the issues of family 
ownership, government ownership and domestic ownership and the effectiveness of board 
and audit committee and, therefore, this study will provide with substantial information 
about issues in the markets of GCC to count on, in the future, as premise data. Limitations 
of the study lie on the other internal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., board of 
directors characteristics and ownership structures). Future line of research should put an 
effort to introduce more characteristics of these mechanisms. Further research should 
replicate this model to determine its validity in different contexts of Arab countries, in 
different time periods, and with different sample sizes. These limitations may motivate 
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